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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A.L. Williams and MILICO accept the statement of issues 
presented for review by Conder, but add the following: 
1. Is Conder permitted to raise for the first time on 
appeal objections to evidence adduced in support of the motion 
for summary judgment? 
2. Did Conder waive by failing timely to interpose them 
objections to the trial courtfs reference to his unpublished 
deposition testimony in ruling on the motion for summary 
judgment? 
3. Is Conder estopped of objecting on appeal to the use 
A.L. Williams and MILICO of testimony by Conder in his 
unpublished deposition in support of their motion for summary 
judgment where Conder relied on such unpublished deposition 
testimony in opposing the motion? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.L. Williams and MILICO accept the Statement of the Case 
given by Conder, but supplement it as follows: 
COURSE AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW. Counsel for moveants 
filed in support of their motion for summary judgment a 
memorandum with numerous references to the deposition testimony 
of Conder. (R634-673) Counsel for Conder submitted an opposing 
memorandum, also with numerous references to Conder's deposition 
testimony. (R472-510) The motion for summary judgment was heard 
by the Honorable Scott Daniels, Salt Lake County District Court 
Judge, on July 27, 1984. (R525-527) Partial summary judgment was 
entered by Judge Daniels on September 5, 1984 dismissing with 
prejudice Conderfs fraud claim. (R526-527, Addendum A) 
Following the entry of partial summary judgment, Conder 
filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as amended, to amend the judgment on the grounds of 
error of law. (R528-529) The motion was heard by Judge Daniels 
on September 28, 1984, and he entered an order denying the motion 
on October 11, 1984. (R571-572, Addendum B) 
At no time during the proceedings below did the parties move 
for the publication of the deposition of Conder, nor was that 
deposition published by the lower court on its own motion. 
Conder's counsel made no objection to the use of or 
reference to this deposition testimony at the hearing on the 
motion for summary judgment, nor did he move to surpress the 
testimony. Counsel for moveants is informed and believes that 
those proceedings were not reported, and therefore no citation to 
the record can be used to support this. Conder's attorney failed 
at the hearing on his motion to amend judgment to move to 
surpress or make any objection to the use of or reference to 
Conder's deposition testimony in connection with the granting of 
the motion for summary judgment. (R610-633) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A.L. Williams and MILICO accept the Statement of Facts given 
by Conderf but supplement it as follows: 
Conder claims representatives of A.L. Williams and MILICO 
made the following representations to him before he went to work 
for those entities. First, that A.L. Williams is "a company like 
E.F. Hutton, Dean Whitter, Merrill Lynch." (R475) Second, that 
A.L. Williams is "a financial services type company." (R475) 
Third, that A.L. Williams could sell "everything from insurance, 
[sic] real estate, [sic] investments." (R475) Fourth, A.L. 
Williams has "an investment side of the house" and "an insurance 
side of the house." (R475) 
Conder desired to enter the investment counselling business 
(R512) and claims to have relied on these representations in 
signing an Agent Agreement with MILICO on March 10, 1980. 
(R436-439, 475, 518, 640; Addendum C) 
The Agent Agreement sets forth the scope of Conder's authority to 
act for MILICO and expressly limits that authority to "the sale 
of life insurance and annuities," (Addendum C, HI. Scope of 
Authority, A.) The agreement also recites, in pertinent part: 
"H. This agreement, including any schedules and exhibits 
attached hereto and the provisions thereof, constitute the entire 
agreement between the parties." (Id., 1[7, General Provisions, 
H.) Conder signed no agreements at any time with A.L. Williams. 
(R475) 
Conder learned about one month after coming to work for A.L. 
Williams and MILICO that A.L. Williams offered no training 
classes in the areas of real estate or investments (R476, 640), 
and that A.L. Williams was only the marketing organization of a 
life insurance company. (R512) Notwithstanding this knowledge, 
and in spite of his claimed desire to enter the financial 
counselling business, Conder continued working with A.L. Williams 
and MILICO selling only insurance. He was promoted within three 
months to Sales Supervisor (R477, 512), and within eight months 
to District Manager. (R477, 512-513) His only business 
activities with A.L. Williams and MILICO during this period were 
selling MILICO insurance and managing subordinates. He never 
received training to sell real estate or securities through 
November, 1981 by which time he had no further business 
relationship with either A.L. Williams or MILICO. (R643) Conder 
did not formally resign (R480), but claims he was improperly 
discharged. (R5) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Conderfs claim for fraud requires a showing that his 
reliance upon the subject representations was reasonable. His 
reliance on such representations became and continued to be 
unreasonable as a matter of law when he learned they were false, 
and he thereby has no cause of action for damages accruing 
thereafter. 
2. Conder is charged with the duty to minimize his damages. 
He is barred by the doctrine of avoidable consequences from 
recovering such damages as may have accrued after he discovered 
the falsity of the subject representations. If Conder claims 
damage from working for companies which sold only life insurance 
and he desired to work for companies which sold other financial 
products, he was obligated to seek other employment promptly 
after discovering that A.L. Williams and MILICO sold only life 
insurance. 
3. Conder failed to object to or move to strike references 
to his deposition testimony in the memorandum and oral argument 
supporting the motion for summary judgment. Conder relied on the 
deposition testimony in his memorandum and oral argument opposing 
summary judgment. He is precluded from raising for the first 
time on appeal objections to evidence adduced in support of the 
motion for summary judgment. His deposition testimony was before 
the Court in the form of references to it in memoranda. Conder 
waived his objections to this procedure by not timely raising 
them. Furtherf Conder is estopped from claiming this procedure 
as error since he relied on it in his memorandum. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CONDER'S RELIANCE ON THE SUBJECT 
MISREPRESENTATIONS BECAME UNREASONABLE AS 
A MATTER OF LAW UPON HIS DISCOVERY OF 
THEIR FALSITY. 
Among the nine elements of fraud is that plaintiff act 
reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity of the 
misrespresentation upon which he relies. Pace v. Parishy 122 
Utah 141, 144-145, 247 P.2d 273, 274-275 (1952); Mikkelson v. 
Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982). 
There must be a concurrence of all elements of a claim for 
fraud for the claim to be actionable. Perry v. Hansen, 585 P.2d 
574, 577 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co., 560 
P.2d 789, 793 (Ariz. 1977). Each element must be proved by clear 
and convincing evidence. Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 
supra, at 126. 
This Court must review the evidence presented below in the 
light most favorable to Conder and draw all reasonable inferences 
in his favor. Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 
420, 423, 413 P.2d 807, 809 (Utah 1966). Partial summary 
judgment on the fraud claim was proper if, under this scrutiny, 
there appears no evidence or inference creating a genuine dispute 
about whether Conder acted reasonably and in ignorance of the 
falsity of the misrepresentations allegedly made. 
In Mikkelson v. Quail Valley, supra, plaintiff home-buyer 
sued in fraud to recover damages for misrepresentations by 
seller's real estate agent about the number of square feet of 
floor space. Plaintiff had seen an FHA appraisal which showed 
the number of square feet of floor space to be substantially less 
than represented by the agent, and had also inspected the house 
prior to closing the transaction. Defendants argued on appeal 
from an adverse jury verdict that the evidence, viewed in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff, was insufficient as a matter 
of law to support a judgment for misrepresentation. This Court 
agreed, and in reversing the judgment wrote: 
While plaintiff may have initially 
received false information, he cannot 
reasonably continue to rely on it once 
true and corrected information is 
furnished him, particularly when that 
corrected information is contained in a 
document of the importance and dignity of 
an appraisal and related forms. (at 126). 
In reaching its decision, the Court discussed three Utah 
cases of note: 
In Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 
378, 423 P.2d 659 (1967), this Court 
stated: 
The one who complains of being 
injured by such a false 
representation cannot heedlessly 
accept as true whatever is told 
him, but has the duty of exercising 
such degree of care to protect his 
own interests as would be exercised 
by an ordinary, reasonable and 
prudent person under the 
circumstances; and if he fails to 
do so, is precluded from holding 
someone else to account for the 
consequences of his own neglect. 
423 P.2d at 662. 
Similarly, in Kohler v. Garden City, Utah, 
639 P.2d 162 (1981), this Court affirmed 
the denial of a claim for fraud for 
failure to disclose a right-of-way where 
the purchaser of real estate had inspected 
the property and the contract of sale had 
put the purchaser on notice that a 
right-of-way was claimed. 
Plaintiff suggests that Dugan v. Jones, 
Utah 615 Utah [sic] 2d 1239 (1980) is 
dispositive. There, after reviewing the 
evidence presented, this Court reversed 
the dismissal of Jones1 counterclaim for 
misrepresentation as to the amount of 
acreage contained in a parcel of real 
estate he purchased from Dugan. We 
reviewed the evidence and determined that 
Jones had introduced sufficient evidence 
to recover for misrepresentation if the 
trier of fact believed the evidence as 
related by Jones. We stated, '[A] vendee 
of real property, in the absence of facts 
putting him on notice, has no duty to 
investigate to determine whether the 
vendor has misrepresented the area 
conveyed.1 615 Utah 2d at 1247. In the 
instant case, by plaintiff's own 
admission, he had in his possession before 
the closing, documents which put him on 
notice as to the correct footage contained 
in the house. (at 126) 
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In the instant case, Conder should have known upon signing 
the Agent Agreement, which expressly limited his authority to the 
sale of life insurance and annuities and which did not refer to 
the sale of any other financial products, that he was not 
contracting with MILICO or A.L. Williams to sell real estate or 
other investments. The agreement was a document of the same 
importance and dignity as the FHA appraisal in Mikkelson, supra, 
and imposed upon plaintiff the obligation to obtain similar 
formal, written assurances that he would be selling these other 
financial products. More importantly, Conder as a matter of law 
cannot be said reasonably to have relied on the 
representations about the nature of the business activities of 
A.L. Williams after he learned these representations were false. 
POINT II 
THE AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES DOCTRINE 
PRECLUDES CONDER'S RECOVERING DAMAGES 
ACCRUING AFTER HE LEARNED THE FALSITY 
OF THE SUBJECT MISREPRESENTATIONS. 
The general rule in Utah is that a plaintiff suing in tort 
is charged with the duty reasonably to mitigate his damages. 
Thompson v. Jacobsen, 23 Utah 2d 359, 360, 463 P.2d 801, 802 
(1970). This duty, also referred to as the avoidable 
consequences doctrine, "generally operates to prevent one against 
whom a wrong has been committed from recovering any item of 
damage arising from the wrongful conduct which could have been 
avoided or minimized by reasonable means. [Citation omitted]." 
Anqelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah/ 671 P.2d 772f 777 (Utah 
1983). 
Conder did not argue belowf nor does he argue on appeal/ 
that he sustained any significant damage during the period of 
approximately one month when he was not aware that MILICO and 
A.L. Williams then solely in insurance. His fraud claim is that 
he sustained ongoing pecuniary loss because he sold only 
insurance and not real estate and other investments as he 
expected. His damages accrued after he learned that MILICO and 
A.L. Williams would not offer him training or opportunities to 
sell financial products other than insurance. Conderfs 
expectations of greater income from selling real estate and other 
investments in addition to life insurance imposed a duty 
reasonably to avoid frustration of these expectations by seeking 
employment elsewhere upon learning this. However/ Conder took no 
steps; he chose to remain with MILICO and A.L. Williams selling 
life insurance. Any subsequent pecuniary loss cannot be said to 
have been caused by his initial reliance on the alleged 
misrepresentations/ but only by his failure to take reasonable 
steps to prevent avoidable loss. Recovery of such damages is 
barred as a matter of law by the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences. 
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POINT III 
CONDER CANNOT RAISE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN 
SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
On appeal, and for the first time, Conder's counsel argues 
that Judge Daniels erred in granting partial summary judgment by 
relying upon the deposition testimony of Conder since the 
deposition was never published and since evidence in the form of 
published deposition testimony was never received. (Brief of 
Appellant, pp. 10-12). 
In Dugger v. Cox, 564 P.2d 300 (Utah 1977), plaintiffs 
asserted a mechanic's lien against property belonging to 
defendants. The trial court entered judgment foreclosing the 
lien filed against defendant's propertyf and also awarding 
plaintiff attorneys fees and costs. Plaintiff, not an attorney, 
testified that $3,000.00 was a reasonable amount for attorney's 
fees. Defendant challenged the award of attorneys fees on appeal 
on the grounds that there was no evidence submitted on the issue. 
This Court wrote: 
Cox failed to object to testimony of 
plaintiff (not a lawyer) and failed to 
cross examine on this issue, and is in no 
position to raise the matter here for the 
first time. (at 303) 
In Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980), plaintiffs 
sued for an order compelling defendant to remove two gates 
constructed across a road which barred access to plaintiff's real 
property. Plaintiff proposed to use at trial the same evidence 
introduced at trial in a previous lawsuit raising similar issues. 
However/ the witnesses who had testified in the prior trial were 
deceased and plaintiff therefore sought to introduce into 
evidence the abstract of record and briefs on appeal from the 
prior action. This Court wrote: 
Defendants first challenge the admission 
of this evidence on the ground that there 
was no proof offered that these witnesses 
were unavailable at trial. But 
plaintiffs1 counsel represented to the 
District Court that these witnesses were 
deceased at the time of this trial/ and as 
defendants made no objection to this 
representation, and the Court accepted it/ 
they have not preserved this point on 
appeal. [Footnote omitted]. (at 495) 
This Court observed/ in a footnote: 
Had defendants objected to this 
representation, plaintiffs would have had 
an opportunity to produce evidence that 
these witnesses were unavailable. Defects 
curable at trial cannot be relied upon by 
a party if the trial court has had no 
opportunity to rule thereon. See Dugger 
v. Cox/ Utah, 564 P.2d 303 (1977). (Id. 
at 495/ Footnote 8) 
In the instant case, an objection or motion to strike made 
during the proceedings below by Conder's counsel would have 
ensured the correction of any technical problem with the trial 
court's relying on references to unpublished deposition 
testimony. It would be an unfortunate waste of time and valuable 
judicial resources for this Court to reverse the partial summary 
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judgment and remand the matter to the trial court to correct a 
technicality which would have no bearing on the substantive 
issues presented by this appeal. This Court can avoid such a 
waste of resources by disallowing Conder to raise on appeal for 
the first time evidentiary objections he should have raised 
below. 
POINT IV 
CONDER WAIVED BY FAILING TIMELY TO 
INTERPOSE THEM ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE 
REFERENCE BY THE TRIAL COURT TO HIS 
UNPUBLISHED DEPOSITION TESTIMONY. 
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidencef as amended, provides in 
pertinent part: 
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error 
may not be predicated upon a ruling which 
admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is 
one admitting evidence, a timely objection 
or motion to strike appears of record, 
stating the specific ground of the 
objection, if the specific ground was not 
apparent from the context.... 
Conder fails to show or contend that any substantial right 
on his part was adversely affected by the procedure of reference 
in memoranda and argument to his unpublished deposition 
testimony. Conder does not contend that any of the testimony in 
his deposition would be objectionable had the deposition been 
published. There was no objection or motion to strike of 
record which would have directed the lower court's attention to 
an evidentiary problem. As this Court wrote in Sanders v. 
Cassity, 586 P.2d 423 (Utah 1978): 
The appellant's failure to raise an 
objection in the earlier proceeding 
constitutes a waiver, and he is estopped 
from raising it in a subsequent proceeding 
involving different partiesf or from 
raising it now on appeal. (at 427) 
POINT V 
CONDER IS ESTOPPED OF OBJECTING ON APPEAL 
TO THE USE OF THE UNPUBLISHED DEPOSITION 
TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In Arrowhead Construction Co. v. Essex Corp., 662 P.2d 1195 
(Kan. 1983), the parties to an action for breach of contract 
entered a stipulation that the coverage of a bond met the 
requirements of a statutory public works bond, when in fact the 
bond was a labor and materials payment bond. The effect of 
treating the bond as a statutory public works bond was that 
certain liens filed by contractors of a construction project were 
discharged. The trial court entered an order granting judgment 
on the pleadings discharging liens previously filed based on the 
stipulation. The appellants then sought to attack the order by 
withdrawing their stipulation. 
The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that appellants were 
precluded by the doctrine of estoppel from changing their 
position: 
Further, this is a classic case for the 
assertion of the doctrine of estoppel. As 
a general rule parties to an action are 
bound by their pleadings and judicial 
declarations and are estopped to deny or 
contradict them where the other parties to 
the action relied thereon and changed 
their positions by reason thereof. 
[Citations omitted]. As noted above, 
Crotts and Henley did not object to the 
stipulation that the bond was a statutory 
public works bond. Instead they relied on 
the stipulation and in process gave up 
their ultimate remedy—foreclosure on 
their lien. They then had to depend upon 
their ability to prove their breach of 
contract claim against Arrowhead. 
Obviously, it would be prejudicial to 
Crotts and Henley to allow appellants to 
change their position at this late date. 
[Citation omitted]. (at 1201) 
Conder*s counsel made numerous references to the deposition 
testimony of his client in the memorandum opposing the motion for 
summary judgment. He failed to move to publish the deposition 
and failed to object to the reference in memoranda to the 
unpublished deposition testimony, thereby apparently acquiescing 
to the procedure of putting the deposition testimony before the 
trial judge without formally publishing the deposition. The 
conduct of Conder's counsel, especially his failure timely to 
make an objection or motion to strike, created no apparent need 
for the publication of Conderfs deposition testimony and it was 
on this basis that counsel for A.L. Williams and MILICO made no 
motion to publish. It would now be unfairly prejudicial to A.L. 
Williams and MILICO for Conder to be permitted to object to the 
reference to Conder's unpublished deposition testimony. Under 
these circumstances, Conder is estopped by the conduct of his 
attorney of asserting on appeal objection to the use of and 
reference to his unpublished deposition testimony in the 
proceedings below. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, A.L. Williams and MILICO 
respectfully submit that this Court should affirm the partial 
summary judgment dismissing with prejudice Conderfs cause of 
action for fraud. 
DATED this /2 day of March, 1985. 
RESPEQTFUI^Y^UBMI^SjED , 
-16-
CLIFFORD C. ROSS, Bar No. 
H A N S O N . D U N X . E P P E R S O N <& SMITH 
CT o lolcbteanai K^QKpasiatian I 
\ 
ATTORNEYS FOR: 
65ocLARK-LEAMiNd»tfw*a«TteRA. L. Williams and MILICO 
175 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: 363-7611 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES H. CONDER, 
vs 
Plaintiff, 
A. L. WILLIAMS & ASSOCIATES, 
INC., a Georgia Corporation, 
MASSACHUSETTS INDEMNITY AND 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
Massachusetts Corporation; and 
BRYCE D. PETERSON, 
Defendants. 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: C 82-6987 
Judge Scott Daniels 
THIS MATTER came on regularly for hearing on Friday, 
July 27, 1984, at the hour of 2:00 p.m., before the Honorable 
Scott Daniels. Plaintiff was represented by counsel, Dennis 
Wright. Defendants, A. L. Williams & Associates Inc., and 
Massachusetts Indemnity and Life Insurance Company were 
represented by counsel, Clifford C. Ross. Defendant Bryce D. 
Peterson appeared neither in person nor through counsel. 
ADDENDUM A 
526 
The matter before the Court on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment of A. L. Williams & Associates, Inc.f and Massachusetts 
Indemnity and Life Insurance Companyf and the Court having heard 
the arguments of the parties, reviewed the memoranda offered in 
support of the respective positions of the parties and having 
been fully advised in the premises, 
NOW HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants, A* L. 
Williams & Associates and Massachusetts Indemnity and Life 
INsurance Company Company seeking dismissal with prejudice of the 
First Cause of Action for fraud as set forth in the Complaint of 
Plaintiff herein on filef is GRANTED, and the First Cause of 
Action for Fraud in the Complaint herein on file is hereby 
dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. 
2. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants, A. L. 
Williams & Associates Inc., and Massachusetts Indemnity and Life 
Insurance Company seeking dismissal of the Second Cause of Action 
for Wrongful Termination, and the Third and Fourth Causes of 
Action for Breach of Contract as set forth in the Complaint 
herein on file is hereby denied. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 3 day of < ^ ^ ^ £ ^ U v ' , 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
FILMED i 
CLIFFORD C. ROSS, Bar No.: 2802 
HANSON, DONN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorney for: Defendants 
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V. 
Plaintiff, 
A. L. WILLIAMS & ASSOCIATES, 
INC., a Georgia Corporation, 
MASSCHUSETTS INDEMNITY AND 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
Massachusetts Corporation, and 
BRYCE D. PETERSON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: C 82-6987 
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS 
' ' " i i ri i i r * r i ' " * » » • 1 " 1 " " " •* . . . . . ! > . > . , . , > i , ^ . , " , , l i J " J '*- ' J l I \ " >>* >.L 11. .->> _i.. ^ u i i . , , •> • , . . . . . . r. 1> , n . , ... . . . , . , . 
THIS MATTER came on regularly for hearing before the 
Honorable Scott Daniels on Friday, September 28, 1984, on Motion 
of Plaintiff to Amend Judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). Plaintiff 
was represented by counsel, Dennis L. Wright, Defendants, A. L. 
Williams & Associates and Massachusetts Indemnity and Life 
Insurance Company were represented by counsel, Clifford C. Ross. 
Defendant, Bryce D. Peterson appeared neither in person nor 
through counsel. 
ADDENDUM B 
571 
The Court having reviewed the memoranda of the 
respective parties, and having heard oral argument, and having 
been fully advised in the premises, now hereby 
ORDERS that Plaintiff's Motion to Amended Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 59(e) be and hereby is DENIED. 
It appearing that this order adjudicates fewer than all 
of the claims and with respect to fewer than all of the parties, 
the Court hereby expressly determines that there is no just 
reason for delay and enters this order as a final order pursuant 
to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, with 
respect to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment pursuant to Rule 
59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED this »X\... day of October, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
DENNIS L. WRIGHT, 
Attorney for Plat|it)iffd 
,9om, JCfrUuiL 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON ttl.-.rJLEY 
Cor* 
/• i i* fwr d y<-~r-L 
Deputy C'.?r* 
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NOTE REGARDING ADDENDUM C; 
Addendum C is the Agent Agreement signed by Conder March 10, 
1980. The photostatic copy found at R436-439 is difficult to 
read, and for convenience a copy of the identical Agent Agreement 
which is Exhibit 1 to Conder*s August 23/ 1983 deposition is also 
supplied. 
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, „ i k i - M * Nit*******!*** imWmtiMi utol I t f f t«*wft*« ; j n f w y r^iMMi*wty» a**** 
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2 | ® INDEMNITY AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
AGENT AGREEMENT 
. day of /VlPrg^ff This Agreement is : i > and entered into as of the _ 
19MS2L^ hy and between Massachusetts Indemnity and Life Insurance Company ("Company**)* and 
1. Scope of Aathority 
A. Agent shall represent the Company for the sale of life Insurance and annuitiet for the Company in the non-
exclusive territories CTcrntory") designated in the commission schedule or schedules ("Commission S c h e c W ) , which 
Commission Schedule is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference; to make proper delivery of pc4ic.es 
issued by the Company upon those applications; to collect the first year premiums on those policies for the Company; 
and to remit those premiums to the Manager designated by A.L. Wduams & Associates, Inc. (th* "General A s t W ? . 
Agent's authority is expressly limited to the above. 
B. Agent shall be compensated by the Company and not by General Agent. 
C. It is understood that Agent is an independent contractor and nothing herein shall be cotutrjed to create the* 
relationship of employer and employee between Company or General Agent and Agent. Agent has no authority to Incur 
any liability on behalf of or to bind the Company in any way or to alter its rights, duties, or obligations. Within the 
Territory designated herein, the Agent shall be free to exercise his own Judgment and discretion 21 to the persons from 
whom the Agent will solicit applications, as to the time and p?ace of solicitation, and, subject to the Agmt's strict com-
pliance with the laws and insurance regulations of the jurisduuon in whir* the Agent is soliciting apphcatiOT* and the 
rules and regulations of ihe Company for as Agents, as 10 the methods. b> which the d*sircd results are to be obtained. 
2. Rights and Obligations of the Company 
A. During the term of thrs Agreement, provided \gim 1$ in compliance with the terms, provisions, and covenants of 
this Agreement, the Company shall pay Agent commissions as provided m the Comm ss.on Schedule. 
B. Agent agrees that the commissions pavable during the term of this Agreemcrt pursuant to the Commission 
Schedule s' ill be accepted by him as full compensation for all services performed hereunder. No commissions or other 
< ompensation (including the deferreu pernor of first year commissions) snail be paid to the Agent subsequent to the ter-
mination of this \grcement. 
C. The ior.mssions specified in the Commission Schedule shall be modified whenever neccviry to conform to the 
legal requirement of any state. 
D. />gent agu» * that all of Agent's obligations coruined in this Agreement are for the berefit of trtc Company as 
well as the Genera, \gent a.id that the Company may enforce this Agreement against Agent. 
3. Rights and Obligations of Agent 
A. Agent shall, prior to soliciting applications in any state in the Territory, be properly licensed by the Insurance 
Department <>. and appointed by the Company, in such state 
B. Agent shall use only those Conns, applications, and advertising materials turrushed or authortred by the Company 
anJ shall comply with the office procedures, guidelines, and rules promulgated by »he Comnanv as now used or in force 
or as hereafter a-nended or supplemented No written sales presentation of any kind *hall be used by Agent until it ha* 
first been approved, in writing, by the Company No oral presentation for any polic> may beus-d that does not conform 
to the sta'utes and regulations of the jurisdiction in which it is made or which does not accurately reflect the terms and 
conditions of the insurance policy being sold. 
C. Agent shall immediately repoi and remit to Manager all first-year or otho ; rcmiums collected by Agent 
Mi A 99 7 hO 
v. Agent %y *; * n / " Uy and hold the Company and GcneraT Agael 'If JOCQ any legal actio©, lost, coal, 
******* ** * ^ \ j J* ^ « * result of acts or emiuioni of Agent. • V 
E. Agent has no authority to do and agrees not to do any of the following (1, to make, alter or discharge ai»y 
contract, policy or receipt, or waive any provision or condition N:reof; (It to ic:mc any monies on behalf of the 
Company other than upon strict compliance with the terms and conditions of the receipts, policies or cooiracta i*»ued by 
the Company and in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Company; or 01 to make any misrepresesuatJoQ or 
incomplete comparison for the purpose of Inducing a policyholder of the Company or any other company to convert, 
lapse, forfeit or surrender his insurance therewith. 
F. Agent agrees that, for any policies sold by Agent which have lapsed and art refold or reinstated within twtrvt (U) 
months of the lap* date of the policy, such policies will be considered aa reinstatements, and commissions oa 
reinstatements shall be limited to the amount that would have bees payable if the renewal premium on the existing policy 
had bees paid. If a lapsed policy is not accepted for reinstatement and, as an alternative, new business (s written* tbea 
new business commission will be paid. 
Agent further agrees that, if no effort is made by the Agent to reinstate lapsed potidea within a reajooabfc period 
following the lapse of such policies, General Agent or the Company reserves the right to mate it •staiemealattesapc* of 
iff own and make commission adjustment to Agent pur**iant to its policy oo reinstates .** . 
4. Cobuaiasioe Advances and Chargeback Systeei 
A. Company wilt, on a weekly basis, advance to Agent at the time a completed and signed application for a deposit 
term life insurance policy is received together with (i) full first year premi.un, (ii) one monthly premium and ail necessary 
pre-authorized check forms, or (iii) government allotment premium in accordance with company requirements and other 
required documents, up to a maximum of the lesser of 1t*h of the first year life commission or $500.00 (the "advance 
commissions**). Advance commission* paid to the Agent will create a debit balance which may, subject to the provisions 
of paragraph B below, at the option of the Company, be offset o> iii amounts owing from Company to Agent and sriil 
constitute the indebtedness of the Agent to the Company and Agent's absolute obligation. 
B. That portion of advance commissions paid (taking into account the current week's business) to the Agent but not 
fully earned as a result of (i) applications which do not result in the issuance of a policy (ii) policies which arc cancelled by 
.he insured (iii) policies which lapse or (iv) misciassification of premium or other error will be recovered in th« following 
order: 
1. If pursuant to subparagraph 2 an advance commission is payable, Agent will be charged back up to 50^ "t of 
the advance commissions otherwise payable to Agent pursuant to paragraph A.; chargebacks in excess of that 
sum will be carried forward and deducted from the next weekly advance commissions on the same basis. 
2. Advance commissions will be paid only to the extent tha. in the event the Agent's debit ba'ance is less than 
80*t of Deferred First Year Commissions on (i) policies which are in force and (ii) applications for policies 
("Deferred First Year Commissions**). The •*80Vf** may be reduced upon the written notice of A.L. Williams A 
Associates, Inc. u the Con,?* *.y. 
3. By applying Agent's earned commissions. 
4. If during the term of this Agreement Atom's debit balance exceeds &0?» of Deferred First Year Commis-
sions, Agent shall, on demand be obligated to pay to the Company the amount of the difference between Agent's 
debit balance and ttWo of Deferred First Year Commissions. 
5. In the ev*n* of a termination oi tuts Agreement, Agent shall upon demand immediately pay to the Compare 
the amount of Agent's debit balance. 
C. Except as they may be applied pursuant tr subparagraph B.3, earned commissions, as reflected in the commission 
statement, will be pa»d monthly or. at ihe option of the Company, more frequently. 
5. Restrictive Covenants, Trade Secrets 
and Confidential Information 
A. \g-ni ajirecs that he will not, at any time during the term of this Agreement, directly oi indirectly, induce or 
attempt to inJu-a «*n\ polio holder of the Company to terminate, reduce coverage, borrow money against, or replace any 
pottcyhoiv 
B. Agent agrees that he will not, directly or indirectly, while he u assooeird with the Company or at any 'i»e wuhu, 
two years thereafter (i) induce or attempt to induce any of the Company'* i ^ u or employees whn coco pn* -J* 
Company's sales forces and/or any portion of the Company's adrnJiJ*tra»lv*
 5U/T 10 tmnm»te thot reUtior*5v wan 
the Company, or induce 01 attempt to uvtuce an such agents to sell or solicit kns»ir*nc* for any other tf^ir»ort coop*u>r 
or insurance agency, or (u) to associate in any other insurance business with or hire or engage any of the Company's taka 
forces and/or administrative staff, until after any such individual shall havt terminated bis employment or tfftrfaHtcn 
with the Company for a penod of at least one year. 
C. 1B the event of any breach of this Paragraph 5, the Company or General Agent may, in addition to any other 
righu or remedies available to it at law or in equity, declare that no further commissions shall accrue or be paid tader 
this Agreemsm and seek an injunction to enforce the provisions of the Paragraph 5 against the Agmc 
6. Agmsswet Teres; Teraaiaatioa 
This Agreement may be terminated by either the Company or the Agent effective immediately after the mai&ag of 
written notice of such termination. 
7. General Provisioee 
A. The failure of the parties to enforce any of the provisions of this Agreement shall not constitute g waiver of such 
provisions. 
B. All notices or demands sent by mail (as an alternative to personal service) shall be sent by registered or certified 
mail, pos'agc and registration or certification fees prepaid, return receipt requested, as follows: if ** the Companyf 
addressed to Massachusetts Indemnity and Life Insurance Company, 5130 Wilshirc Boulevard, <*nU Monica, 
California 90406, if to the General Agent at his address set forth below, if to the Agent, addressed to him at the last 
address on the commission records of the General Agent or the Company. 
C in the event that any party hereto commences an action to enforce any of the piovtsions hereof, the prevailing 
party in such action shall be entitled to an award of its reasonable attorneys* fees and ail cost* incurred in connection 
therewith. 
O If any clause, paragraph, term or provision of this Agreement shall be found to be void and unenforceable by any 
court of competent jurisdiction, such finding shall have no effect upon any other clause, paragraph, term or provision of 
the Agreement, ana the sarr.r ^hall be given full force and effect 
E. Ag nt expressly represents and warrants that he has the authority to enter into this Agreement and that he is not 
or will not be, by virtue of entenng into this Agreement or otherwise, in breach of any other agreement with any other 
insurance company, association, firm, person or corporation 
F. This Agreement shall be binding upon the successors and assigns of Company, General Agent as well as Agent's 
successors and permissive assigns 
G Neither this Agreement, any part hereof nor the commiss ons tc be paid hereunder, shall be assignable by Agent 
without the written consent of the General Agent and the Company 
H This Agreement, including any schedules and exhibits attached hereto and the provisions thereof, constitute the 
entire agreement of the parties No modification hereof %hail be binding upon General Agent or the Company unless in 
writing and signed or initialed by an officer of General Agent and the Company. This Agreement supercedes ail prior 
agreements between the Company and the Agent. 
MASSACHUSETTS INDEMNTTV ANDLBP 
INSURANCE C O M P A N V U ' E 
. _ ' w-.c K 
(Officer) 
So*** Security Number 
> oM^L 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS on this /^\ day of 
March, 1985, to: 
Dennis L. Wright, Esq. 
420 East South Temple, #350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger D. Sandack, Esq. 
500 Kearns Build>tig 
